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1. THE RISE AND FALL  
OF AN OPEN BUSINESS MODEL
Today, business model (BM) tends to be considered as the main driver of 
the performance of organizations whatever their sector. The literature 
stresses particularly how BM innovation may disrupt competition and 
create competitive advantage (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; 
Giesen et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2008; Svejenova et al., 2010). Innovation 
in the domain has been prolific since the advent of the Internet era and 
numerous examples have been analyzed such as Amazon, Google or IBM. 
The statement of managers and academics is that in most cases, product 
or service innovation cannot sustain a competitive advantage today and 
1 We would like to thank all the participants of the BETA seminar on business models 
held in Strasbourg, for their comments on an earlier version of this article. A spe-
cial thank for Emmanuelle Fauchart for her accurate comments and the sugges-
tions she provides. This research benefits from a grant from LMCU (Lille Métropole 
Communauté Urbaine).
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companies have to rethink profoundly their business models (Amit and 
Zott, 2012). A study of the Economist Intelligence Unit (2005) has revealed 
that a majority of managers (54%) are more confident in business model 
innovation than in new products or services to develop a competitive 
advantage.
Among the different BM innovations we have witnessed these last years, 
open innovation appears as introducing a breakthrough in the traditional 
way of doing business. Indeed, Chesbrough (2003) popularized the term 
and announced a paradigmatic change in innovation and knowledge sha-
ring. Not only this open movement changes the innovation process but 
it also modifies organizations themselves by reconfiguring value chains 
and networks, leading to what is called open business models (Chesbrough, 
2006). Examples are numerous especially in the Internet sector with com-
panies such as Flickr or Apple, which have been able to develop platforms 
for the development of complementary products. Open BMs generate new 
sources of value through an increase in the rate of innovations and an 
improvement of the product diversity (Boudreau, 2010). Moreover, open 
BMs enable firms to cut off partly the cost of their innovation process 
(Chesbrough et al., 2006). Thus, open BM appears potentially as an interes-
ting strategy for increasing value creation for customers and for economi-
zing on costs for an innovator. 
However, thinking only about value generation and economizing may lead 
to a trap. Indeed, BM literature invites to reflect on value generation, on 
economizing but also on value capture mechanisms. These last ones depend 
heavily on the appropriability regime and on the ease to imitate the BM 
(Teece, 1986, 2010) indicating that the management of property rights lies 
at the core of the potential success of an open BM (Henkel, 2006). Thus, 
in this paper we would like to deepen the literature on open BM by focu-
sing especially on the consequences of such BM at the individual (the orga-
nization level) and collective (the sector) levels, and on the conditions to 
use successfully this strategy. Thus, our general research question can be 
summed up as what are the conditions for success and consequences in 
terms of performance of the adoption of an open BM? Our line of reaso-
ning is twofold. First, the BM innovation is often studied at the indivi-
dual level of analysis. The study of the diffusion and impact of an open 
BM at the sector level is rare, even if we can anticipate that it changes 
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radically a sector by implicating other companies, complementors or com-
petitors (Lecocq and Demil, 2006). Secondly, the apparent paradox of an 
open BM is to share knowledge or innovation with others. Thus, in these 
conditions, how an innovator may generate and capture value becomes a 
puzzling question.
We draw from the case of the Role Playing Game (RPG) sector to study the 
impact of the introduction of an open BM with a high level of openness 
(sharing of Intellectual Property –IP). This new BM was introduced by the 
leader to escape the stalemate in the sector. We analyze the case and try 
especially to illuminate the lessons of its initial success and its final fai-
lure. Indeed, the main mechanisms at the source of the success of the new 
BM were also the main sources of its failure.
2. FROM PROPERTY RIGHTS STRATEGIES  
TO OPEN BUSINESS MODELS
Despite the debates concerning its foundations and definitions, the concept 
of BM refers to a combination of organizational activities to generate value 
and sustain the development of an organization (Demil and Lecocq, 2010; 
Zott et al., 2011). The activities are bundles of competences and resources. 
Among these resources and competences, the innovation activity and the 
IP produced by this activity are prominent in a lot of sectors. Firms may 
envisage managing this activity very differently. In particular, Teece 
(1986) develops the ways a company may earn profit from its innovation 
by insisting on the potential disconnection between the knowledge a firm 
develops (patented or not) and the products in which this knowledge is 
embedded. Teece identified three main strategies by which the innovators 
can capture value from their innovations. In an integrated BM, the firm 
exploits alone its innovation and develops all the required activities along 
its value chain (manufacturing, sales, after-sales services, complemen-
tary services). In this view, the firm is autonomous as it copes alone with 
the innovation process and does not depend on partners, except its custo-
mers. At the other extreme, the company exploits its innovation through 
knowledge licensing –freely or not- but does not try to release its own pro-
ducts. Then, the success of the innovation depends entirely on the capaci-
ties of the coopetitors. An extreme example of such choice can be found in 
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the open source movement to develop software. Between these two cases, 
the most common cases consist in a mixed approach where the innova-
tor tries to extract value from an innovation by exploiting some activities 
in its value chain and by outsourcing some others, requiring then a selec-
tion process among potential partners. In these situations, the capacity 
to cooperate with partners and to establish adequate rules of governance 
becomes crucial.
Firms are making choices to manage their innovation activities and 
particularly their IP and knowledge. We name these choices property 
rights strategies as they relate to the openness and accessibility of IP 
and knowledge for coopetitors. These options can be represented along-
side a continuum extended from totally proprietary to open source stra-
tegies with several fine-grained choices between these two extremes 
(Table 1)2. These strategic choices cover the way a firm keeps its knowledge 
and IP more or less proprietary, and selects or not partners to deve-
lop its innovation. The traditional conception of property rights deals 
with the proprietary approach. In this case, managers are invited to 
improve the strength of their patents and property rights, and their sub-
sequent strategy is often envisaged from a defensive point of view (e.g. 
Shapiro, 1990; Fay, 1993). The other extreme of the continuum appears 
more recently in the literature and is more and more publicized with the 
open source movement. It consists in sharing freely an innovation with 
others in order to insure especially diffusion, product improvements or 
diversity.
2 Compared to Teece (1986), the continuum we propose introduces the extreme case of 
open source. We are also distinguishing several strategic choices according the num-
ber of licensees and the assets that a firm keeps proprietary.
The Rise and Fall oF an open Business Model
R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 14 6  ➻  2 E T R IME S T R E 2 014 89
Tableau 1. The continuum of property rights strategies  
(adapted from Lecocq and Demil, 2002)







No licensing, no  
abandonment of  
property rights
The firm alone Autonomous 
action
Integrated BM
IP remains the property 
of the firm




IP remains the property 
of the firm
Licenses granted to 
numerous coopetitors
Some property rights are 
abandoned
Selection of licensees
Some property rights are 
abandoned




Free license, all property 
rights are abandoned




This continuum of property rights strategies requires several comments. 
First, an open BM implies that the innovation activities are divided 
among multiple partners and an open BM seeks to harness external par-
ties (Chesbrough, 2006). Openness does not mean that the firm abandons 
all its IP or knowledge to everyone. Indeed, openness is largely a ques-
tion of degrees, the firms choosing what they disclose and share (Henkel, 
2006). As for open innovation, openness means that there is exchange 
of knowledge with external actors, for instance to accelerate the inno-
vation process, to expand the market for the innovation, or to improve 
the quality of the innovation. In this view, a firm may choose to open 
some elements to some actors and restrict access to some others, such as 
in the case of Android that is open for the software developers but com-
pletely closed for the other OEMs. Secondly, the property rights strategy 
of a focal firm can evolve over time and consequently its BM (e.g. from an 
open strategy to a proprietary strategy or vice versa). For example, Intel 
adopted this dual clock property rights strategy by largely licensing its 
architecture in a first time to diffuse it before withholding licenses and 
developing a proprietary strategy (Afuah, 1999). Finally, property rights 
strategies impact differently the structure of an industry and the strate-
gies of the other firms (Kogut et al., 1995). Adopting a proprietary approach 
strategy leads to autonomous strategies and to disconnect competitors 
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from each other. For users, it creates communities that are often locked 
into one supplier’s technology. On the contrary, an open approach strategy 
relies on cooperation and co-evolution and creates networks of connected 
coopetitors. Indeed, it allows many suppliers to use the technology and 
creates consequently interdependencies between different actors.
Beyond the role and management of IP rights, open BM is also characte-
rized by a given organization of the various stakeholders in the innova-
tion and production processes. Boudreau and Lakahani (2009) have pro-
posed different empirical configurations of open BM and identified in 
particular three types of open BM. These configurations depend on the 
relationships between a sponsor who releases a platform (an open pro-
duct), the external innovators who use the platform to release their own 
innovations and the final customers (Figure 1). The first open BM labelled 
‘integrator platform’ refers to an open BM where the sponsor of the plat-
form integrates external innovation to sell the final products to custo-
mers. In the second case, external innovators use the platform to release 
their products that are then, sold to the customers. Finally in the ‘two-
sided platform’ BM, external innovators and customers who are affi-
liated to the same platform, transact directly while the sponsor ope-

















Integrator platform Product platform Two-sided platform
Figure 1. Three open BM (from Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009, p. 73)
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external innovators and customers have a high autonomy as noticed 
by Boudreau and Lakhani (2009). In these last situations, we may won-
der what are the risks associated with the implementation of such an 
open BM.
In the next section, we introduce the empirical study of the RPG sector to 
explore the consequences of an open BM for the performance of the orga-
nizations, in the short and long term, and subsequently the conditions 
under which such an open BM are at risk.
3. DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS
Our empirical study concerns Role Playing Game (RPG) industry, a niche 
market hobby of the toy industry. Despite a lack of some data – especially 
financial data –, the sector offers a rare opportunity to study an open BM 
from its inception to its abandonment. Indeed, it displays the advantage 
of witnessing the introduction of a new open BM at the end of the 90’s by 
the leader, Wizards of The Coast, and then its progressive return to a clo-
ser approach in 2008. Moreover, RPG is a low-tech industry and the study 
of innovation in such a sector remains rare.
The population under investigation is constituted by tabletop English lan-
guage RPG publishers3 releasing printed books until the advent of the Pdf 
files at the end of the 1990’s. While several publishers are either British or 
Canadian, the vast majority is based in the United States. Our empirical 
study covers the analysis of the RPG industry since its inception in 1974. 
The evolution of the industry was traced back from the qualitative data 
obtained from RPG publications (Comics and Games Retailer, D20 Magazine, 
Dragon Magazine), books (e.g. Schick, 1991; Fine, 2002; Mc Ed, 2010) and 
Internet websites (D20 Reviews, Game Manufacturers Association, Game 
Publishers Association, Gaming Report, RPGA Network, Wizard’s Attic). 
These sources provide qualitative material about the RPG industry, mar-
ket segments, products and consumers. They are the main data sources 
3 These products are not electronic games but are played with pen and paper around a 
table.
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we use in this article and they help to understand the characteristics of 
the sector.
While some of these data where exploited elsewhere (see Lecocq and Demil, 
2006), in this paper we go beyond the mere analysis of the first years after 
the introduction of an open BM in the industry, looking at the trajectory 
of the open BM and its termination in 2008, adopting a dynamic analy-
sis. To understand the evolution of the sector from a quantitative point 
of view we rely on a dataset encompassing 476 RPG publishing companies 
and 6,112 products including both core rules and complementary products. 
Data were collected by crosschecking several convergent archival sources: 
a book on collectibles (Brown and Lee, 1998), and five databases found on 
the Internet and elaborated by fans4. These data help to figure out the 
impact of an open BM on the overall sector and particularly the number 
of editors contributing to the product system of the leader that have imple-
mented an open BM.
Finally, consumers’ opinions and interviews of key actors in the RPG 
industry were found on the following websites: D20 Reviews, Game Spy, 
Gaming Report, RPGNow, RPG Planet. These qualitative data allow unders-
tanding the mechanisms and rationales behind the choices of firms and 
consumers in the industry.
4. THE ROLE PLAYING GAME INDUSTRY
4.1. The emergence of RPG industry
The RPG is a hobby-game popularized in the 70’s with the worldwide suc-
cess of a game called Dungeons & Dragons (D&D) designed by Gary Gygax 
and Dave Arneson. They invented entirely this new hobby, based on their 
shared passion for medieval war-games and for fantasy setting. The RPG 
entertainment form could be defined as “an activity in which a group of people 
4 Pen & Paper encyclopaedia: http://www.pen-paper.net/index.php; RPG Index ency-
clopaedia: http://index.rpg.net/; Darkshire encyclopaedia: http://www.darkshire.
net/~jhkim/rpg/encyclopedia/; Drosi encyclopaedia (in Deutsch): http://www.drosi.
de/lexikon.htm; Guide du Rôliste Galactique (in French): http://www.legrog.org/.
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(called the players) creates and role-plays characters in a world devised by another 
participant, called the Game Master, who describes the results of their actions as well 
as the actions themselves of everything and everybody else in this created world” 
(Kociatkiewicz, 2000, p. 71). Players and the Game Master (or the storytel-
ler) follow rules found in books to create characters and to decide players’ 
actions. The game consists in a storytelling adventure involving generally 
3 to 6 people who take on the roles of selected alter egos and interact orally 
with the other players around a table for several hours (Fine, 2002). From 
the inception of the sector, the companies earned money by selling books 
of rules (around 25$), but also numerous complementary products such as 
scenarios, books describing monsters, new settings or new kinds of cha-
racters (around 10$) (Brown and Lee, 1998). All these products were sold 
directly to customers and through game stores and hobby shops. What is 
fundamental is that most of these complementary products were usable 
and compatible only with the core products constituted by the related 
book of rules. Consequently, once a rule was successfully diffused, regular 
revenues from complementary products were guaranteed.
Gygax and Arneson published their first fantasy RPG game in 1974 just 
after setting up a new company Tactical Studies Rule (TSR). Indeed, in 
1973, Gygax decided that the only way to get the game out would be to 
publish it himself. The first year, the company sold only 1000 exemplars of 
their new game even if Gygax recall that “for every copy that we had sold there 
was at least two copies photocopied”. But the game diffused rapidly through 
the U.S. within a large community of fans via word-of-mouth, especially 
students, and their game reached around 7000 exemplars per month in 
1979. Fanzines dedicated to the new hobby developed since 1975 and helped 
to make it successful. D&D became a full-fledged fad in the United States 
and “the best-known and best-selling RPG with an estimated 20 million people having 
played the game and more than US $1 billion in book and equipment sales” (Mc Ed, 
2010, p. 2). This success attracted rapidly numerous other editors and led 
to the emergence of publishers, fan clubs, conventions, hobby magazines 
and the development of a specific sub-culture involving about five million 
people worldwide playing RPG at least once a month (Dancey, 2000; Fine, 
2002; Booker, 2004).
Despite this competition, TSR moved from a tiny two-people firm to a 
300 employees-company in 1982 and reached sales of nearly US$ 20 million. 
It implemented as soon as 1980 in UK to distribute its products in Europe. 
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Due to its rapid professionalization and regular product innovations, the 
company remained the leader of the sector for a long time. However, dozens 
of new entrants were entering the sector and were releasing new rules and 
thousands of complementary products, exploring new genres different from 
fantasy, even if this last one remain dominant among a dozen of genre 
which may be identified in RPG industry (western, space opera, horror, post-
apocalyptic, super-heroes...).
With the success, the strategic ambition of TSR during the 80’s was to create 
an entertainment company and to become the next Disney Company. As 
a result of this strategy, TSR was granting licenses to anyone that would 
take them. There were D&D beach balls, towels, toys, puzzles, and many 
other licensed items that made much less sense. Thus, despite it maintains 
a proprietary BM in its sector the D&D trademark became so valuable and 
the brand awareness so high that it enabled valorization of the trademark 
itself in other sectors.
4.2. The crisis of the 90’s
Barriers to entry are very low in the RPG activity. The business requi-
red only creativity and several hundreds of dollars to enter in and to 
edit books. Thus, 476 different editors were identifiable over the period 
1974-1999 through the quantitative data collected. Not surprisingly, the 
number of companies in the sector never really decreased as numerous 
entries and exits were annually recorded. But, whereas this proliferation 
of companies and products was not a problem as long as the RPG was a 
growing market in the 80’s – the heyday of the sector –, it became one 
when the sector endures the competition from other hobbies during the 
90’s. Two of them were noticeable and attracted the traditional RPG’s fans: 
trading collecting cards and videogames. As a consequence, from the mid-
90’s, the RPG was in crisis according numerous publishers.
Facing this crisis, one of the TSR’s answers was to become incredibly 
hostile to everyone concerning the exploitation of its IP rights. As the 
Internet exploded onto the public consciousness in the early- to mid-90’s, 
D&D players naturally brought their chosen hobby online. TSR followed 
them, issuing dozens of cease and desist orders that shut down fan sites. 
The company even tried to prevent D&D fans from discussing the game in 
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chat rooms and on message boards, earning derisive nicknames such as: 
“They Sue Regularly” (TSR) or “T$R”, to stress the appetence for money of 
TSR managers. The IP management dictated in detail everything that a 
licensor could do, from the color of a box to exactly which piece of licensed 
D&D artwork the licensee would be forced to use. Even Gary Gygax him-
self wasn’t immune. When Gygax created a new RPG system with Game 
Designer’s Workshop called Dangerous Journeys, TSR sued him for copy-
right infringement. Thus, at that time, the integrated BM resulting from 
a proprietary approach was enforced more strictly than ever and coopera-
tion with coopetitors was not envisaged.
Beyond competition from new hobbies which were attracting the tra-
ditional RPG customers in the 90’s, Ryan Dancey (2002), Wizard of the 
Coast’s5(WOTC) Vice President, explained that the bad situation prevailing 
in the sector was due to the traditional closed BM adopted in the activity. 
He summed up brilliantly the situation like this: 
“The downside here is that I believe that one of the reasons that the RPG as a 
category has declined so much from the early 90s relates to the proliferation of 
systems. Every one of those different game systems creates a «bubble» of market 
inefficiency; the cumulative effect of all those bubbles has proven to be a massive 
downsizing of the marketplace. I have to note, highlight, and reiterate: The problem 
is not competitive product, the problem is competitive systems. I am very much for 
competition and for a lot of interesting and cool products” (Dancey, 2002).
Thus, instead of suffering from harsh and traditional competition between 
products, the sector was suffering above all from a competition between 
the numerous incompatible systems on the market produced by proprie-
tary BM that tend to isolate each community of players and “create bubbles 
of market inefficiency”. This diagnosis was largely publicized in the sector 
and explains the following strategic initiative of the new leader.
5 At the end of 1996, despite a turn-over of U.S. $ 40 million, TSR found itself in a cash 
crush and was over $ 30 million in debt. Therefore, in 1997 the company was sold to 
Wizard of the Coast –the inventor of the collectible cards hobby-, itself bought by 
Hasbro in 1999.
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5. THE D20 SYSTEM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
5.1. The leader’s initiative:  
opening the business model
In the fall of 1998, Peter Atkinson the CEO of WOTC asked Ryan Dancey to 
take over the role of managing the RPG business and to understand what was 
wrong with this line of products after the acquisition of TSR. The basic idea 
of the new BM was presented to the CEO of Hasbro in 1999 and in early 2000, 
the new owner of D&D announced the release of the third edition of its block-
buster with a new system of rules: the “d20 system”, under an open license 
labeled the Open Gaming License (OGL). The OGL was a public copyright license 
under the control of a foundation set up by Ryan Dancey and granted permis-
sion for any tabletop RPG developers to modify, copy, and redistribute some 
of the content designed for their games, the Open Game Content (OGC) (Minion 
Development Corp, 2004). This OGC encompassed globally the game mecha-
nisms and the algorithms of the game. Thus, it allowed commercial and non-
commercial publishers to release complementary products to the system wit-
hout paying for the use of the use of the system’s associated IP.
Despite this openness, the d20 license was established by WOTC and 
remained under its control. Whereas more constraining, this d20 license 
enabled after accepting the terms of the license to use a compatibility 
logo with WOTC’s products and to refer to some of the leader’s products. 
Through this open BM, the sponsor (WOTC) explicitly aimed at promo-
ting reciprocal compatibility between RPGs to boost demand and ultima-
tely profits. The core idea of this strategic change was that the institutio-
nalization of standardized rules of game could be achieved by the efforts 
of competitors. If WOTC could get more people in the industry to use the 
same system, players would learn only one system and be able to migrate 
from product to product and game to game without learning and transac-
tion costs. While it would reduce the number of original gaming systems 
in the market, the idea was to increase the audience for everybody, espe-
cially for the leader. The ultimate goal was to establish “d20” as a recogni-
zable trademark, like “VHS” or “DVD”.
This initiative constituted the first real open system in the sector, drawing 
overtly from open-source principles inspired by the software industry. 
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Indeed, Ryan Dancey evoked explicitly the GPL license and Linux when he 
promoted the new BM:
“It turns out, that for many types of problems, ‘Open Source’ development tends, 
on the whole, to be a better process than traditional, closed source development. 
The curious should look at www.gnu.org, www.opensource.org, and should seek 
out Eric Raymond’s essay ‘The Cathedral and the Bazaar’ via a lookup on any 
capable search engine. There is now a new, viable model for creating complex sys-
tems, using standardized protocols and interfaces that are shared by many people, 
with many independent sub-components that have to work together. Like role-
playing games” (Dancey, 2002).
However, the d20 was not a complete open license as in the open source 
software. Indeed, it grants a perpetual, royalty-free, worldwide and non-
exclusive right to use, modify, reproduce, and distribute on the market 
the OGC. With this license, WOTC gave its competitors access to the greater 
part of its rules system, but certain specific rules and its trademarks and 
logos remained proprietary. This corresponds to a classical choice in IP 
openness where the sponsor shares only a part of his knowledge (Henkel, 
2006). In return, the licensee committed to refer explicitly to the rules of 
D&D in his products, as WOTC hope to sell massively the core rules books 
of D&D to customers. With this open BM, Dancey thought it could exploit 
the network externalities in the sector as he explained in 2004:
“Finally we reached a consensus on an umbrella theory that we could demons-
trate accounted for most of the actual sales & play patterns we were observing in 
the market. That theory was based on a fairly obscure branch of economics called 
Network Effects. One of the odd properties of a gaming business is that it forms a 
network comprised of the players of the games, the groups they gather in to game 
with, and the games they play when they gather. Networks don’t tend to behave 
like typical economic systems. They do very odd things, because the network itself 
becomes a part of the value of the market.
One network effect is called a Network Externality. A network externality happens 
when most of the value of a given product resides in the network connecting the 
users of that product together, rather than in the actual item that is being sold to 
those users. RPGs, it turns out, demonstrate strong signs of network externalities. 
Using the concept of the network externality, we began to be able to explain things 
that our data showed us to be true, even though the conventional wisdom said they 
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were not. And one of the biggest things that data showed us was that a lot more 
people were playing D&D every month than were buying it – by a factor of 100!” 
(Minion Development Corp, 2004, p.4).
The principles of this open BM were threefold. Firstly, any company 
could release henceforth its own products based on D&D’s rules of game. 
Secondly, the d20 license created an umbrella trademark (“d20”) for com-
patible RPGs. Whatever the publishing company, any product using the 
d20 system had to be labeled with the WOTC’s d20 logo, to indicate consu-
mers the product compatibility with other d20 products. Thirdly, as a 
handful of specific D&D rules remained the property of WOTC, any firm 
using the d20 license to develop its own products must include a note on 
the cover of its products that it “requires the use of a Roleplaying Game Core 
Book published by Wizards of the Coast, Inc”. Consequently, although the d20 
license constitutes an open BM, granting partially IP to competitors, it 
does not prevent the sponsor drawing potentially revenues from the sales 
of the core D&D book. Thus, WOTC was expecting to generate new sources 
of revenues by allowing numerous innovators to develop new products 
for customers.
Given its characteristics, d20 license can be considered as a two-sided plat-
form in the framework of Boudreau and Lakhani (2009) previously evo-
ked (see figure 1).
5.2. The short term consequences  
of the open business model
To understand the impact of the new BM, we led a comparison between 
two periods of two years. Indeed, the change of BM introduced by the 
leader impacted rapidly the overall sector as demonstrated in a previous 
paper (Lecocq and Demil, 2006). We have studied especially the structure 
of the sector in terms of the number of companies and the systems of 
games they adopt, before and after the release of the new BM to analyze 
the transition from a proprietary BM to an open BM. We distinguish an 
open BM as the BM of a company adopting the new d20 system, a proprie-
tary BM as a company releasing incompatible products (traditional BM in 
the sector), and finally, a hybrid BM characterized by companies releasing 
both open and proprietary products (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006).
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Two main effects occurred after the release of the d20 in 2000. First, the 
open BM created clearly an entry inducement. After the introduction of 
the open BM, the number of new entrants arrived in the sector to benefit 
from the new d20 system and from the reputation of the leader (Table 2). 
The 2000–01 period saw 78 new entrants into the RPG sector, with only 
20 new entrants in the 1998–99 period (c2 = 12.35, significant at the 0.01 
level). Secondly, the majority of the new entrants adopted the open BM. 
Of the 78 new entrants in the 2000–01 period, 51 adopted the d20 license 
(Table 3). This proportion was markedly greater than for incumbents 
(c2 = 17.89, significant at the 0.01 level). 
Tableau 2. New entrants: comparison of 1998-1999 and 2000-2001 
(Lecocq and Demil, 2006)
1998-1999 2000-2001
New entrants 20 78
Incumbents 49 69
Total 69 147
Tableau 3. The BM adopted by the coopetitors (Lecocq and Demil, 2006)
New entrants Incumbents Total
Open business model (D20 system) 44 2 46
Integrated (Proprietary) business model 27 48 75
Hybrid business model (both d20 and 
proprietary)
7 19 26
Total 78 69 147
Obviously, the release of the d20 was considered by WOTC’s managers as a huge 
success due to the large movement of adoption it created among publishers. 
After the release of the new BM, managers of WOTC estimated that:
“It [third edition] is hugely, wildly successful. We are extremely happy with it. I 
am dancing on my chair as I write this to celebrate. The Core books continue to sell 
very strongly and in fact picked way up this summer. We are 50% above our pro-
jections for Core book sales for the year” (A. Valterra, RPG Business Manager 
for WotC; EN World, nov. 2001).
The factual data we collect corroborate this impression that d20 gained 
rapidly a large audience in the sector (Table 4). If success is apprehended 
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with the release of d20 products (sold as books or Pdf files), this success 
came very shortly after the release of the 3rd open edition of D&D, reinfor-
ced by the massive use of Pdf at that time. It was used both by individuals 
and professional publishers.
Tableau 4. The number of d20 products in the RPG market




25 228 305 377 296 338 298 288 201 144 50 18
Source: RPG.net
Beyond the number of products released, the sales figures indicated also 
an impressive difference between d20 and non-d20 products. For instance, 
the average units of d20 products sold reached 100 for the second quar-
ter 2004 in an important retailing website (RPGNow), whereas they were 
only 40 for closed BM (Minion Development Corp, 2004, p. 37). Similarly, 
d20 publishers typically see 75-200 units sold the first month after their 
release whereas non-d20 publishers record only 10-25 units sold the first 
month (Minion Development Corp., 2006, p. 76). However, as Table 4 
demonstrates, the huge success of d20 system in the few years after its 
release began to erode from the mid 2000’s.
5.3. Mid-term consequences of the open  
business model
Overall, the first objective of the leader was reached. The open BM attrac-
ted rapidly an important support in the sector, especially by new entrants 
who released compatible products with the new platform. This success was 
amplified by the rise of electronic publishing (Pdf files), since small com-
panies were now able to tap the huge market potential of D&D at very low 
cost. For new entrants, the open BM was clearly a good opportunity to 
grasp. But many major incumbent companies produced also contents for 
the d20 system. For several years, d20 system products took a significant 
market share of the RPG industry. As expected, the success of the open BM 
relied heavily on the incentives of openness which allows other publishers 
to release complementary products to the system without paying for the 
use of the associated IP rights. However, the success turned into a failure 
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for two reasons that explained the official abandonment of this open BM 
in 2008, giving publishers one year to sell off their d20 products.
5.3.1. Open business model and the question of IP Rights
The d20 system was not without critics. Some publishers complained that 
WOTC was trying to get a monopoly on the market into accepting the 
D&D rules set as the de-facto standard for the industry and kill off com-
peting systems. In that, they were probably correct, as one of the stated 
goals was to reduce the number of competing game systems. In practice, 
however, many publishers found that the d20 system was a net benefit 
for them. Fundamental questions appeared also concerning the stringent 
control that WOTC exerts over the open gaming movement. Indeed, with 
the d20 system, the company developed the ability to alter the d20 sys-
tem license at will and gives a short, 30 days “cure period” to rectify any 
issues with the license before termination. These changes apply retroac-
tively to all material published under the license and create, for ins-
tance, some censorship from WOTC. When a gaming company attempted 
to publish the d20 Book of Erotic Fantasy, which contained sexuality, WOTC 
altered its license in advance of publication by adding a “decency clause” 
that required publishers comply with standards of decency. Another cri-
tic was based on the part of the d20 license which defines OGC to include 
game mechanics and purports to license it. Indeed, it is widely believed 
that game mechanics cannot be copyrighted in the USA, and “Once a game 
has been made public, nothing in the copyright law prevents others from developing 
another game based on similar principles” (Circular of the US Copyright Office). 
One publisher, Technomancer Press, was deliberately infringing the d20 
license to support this view:
“If you read the text of the Open Gaming License (version 1.0a), it actually res-
tricts companies from using certain terms in their books. For example: You agree 
not to indicate compatibility or co-adaptability with any Trademark or Registered 
Trademark in conjunction with a work containing Open Game Content except as 
expressly licensed in another, independent Agreement with the owner of such 
Trademark or Registered Trademark. This means that saying our books are compa-
tible with Dungeons & Dragons is a violation of the Open Gaming License. In addi-
tion, the d20 System Guide, v5.0 states: You may refer to the Players Handbook by 
title or as the PHB. […] You must not cite page number references… Technomancer 
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Press finds these requirements to be restrictive and more beneficial to Wizards of 
the Coast than any of the d20 System licensees. We also find it to be hypocriti-
cal, considering that Wizards of the Coast’s initial product line consisted of books 
intended to be used in other role-playing systems” (Technomancer Press web-
site, October 5th, 2006). 
This extreme position from an isolated publisher reflects a general assump-
tion in the sector consisting in defending more the open movement (OGL) 
than the d20 system license over which WOTC exerts a strict control and 
may change at will. Indeed, if all d20 products have to use the OGL to 
make use of d20 system, the publishers were able to use OGL without using 
the d20 license. By this, a publisher was not bound by the restrictions of 
the d20 license and the capacity of WOTC to change the license at will 
as indicated by the following clause of the license: “Changes to Terms of the 
License - Wizards of the Coast may issue updates and/or revisions to this License wit-
hout prior notice. You will conform in all respects to the updated or revised terms of 
this License. Subsequent versions of this License will bear a different version number” 
(Article 9, The D20 System Trademark License version 6.0).
It appeared also that the new BM collided with the traditional amateurs’ 
culture of the RPG sector which was hostile to the dominance of a com-
pany and promoted diversity. Indeed, numerous companies were created 
by fans of the hobby who were not professional managers. Finally, this BM 
implied also for editors to manage correctly IP and to respect the terms of 
the licenses that appears difficult in the sector. Several managers of WOTC 
account bitterly about these last difficulties:
“Sometimes it seems that people are willing to do anything but learn the rules for 
using the licenses [OGL/d20]. I get a lot of phone calls and e-mails from start up 
companies who have a ton of questions. It takes about three questions and I realize 
they don’t even know the difference between the OGL License and the d20 license, 
in fact they haven’t read the licenses.” (A. Valterra, RPG Business Manager 
for WotC; EN World, nov. 2001).
Ryan Dancey confirms this point in an open letter to d20 publishers regar-
ding the Open Gaming License or the d20 System Trademark License after 
the GenCon 2001 (EN World):
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“On the other hand, we just got back from GenCon, and even a cursorial review of 
the products in the exhibit hall demonstrated a shocking lack of ability to comply 
with the Open Gaming License or the d20 System Trademark License. As a result, 
Wizards is going to take some official actions in the next few weeks to attempt 
to rectify the situation before it gets further out of hand. […] the obligations of 
the OGL and the d20 STL are NOT OPTIONAL.” Dancey (2002) added later, 
slightly infuriated, : “I don’t know what it is about the psychology of game 
publishers, but even when you can convince a group of them that there’s a better 
way to do something, they all seem bound and determined to prove they can do 
that thing from scratch themselves.”
Thus, despite all the information diffused by WOTC and the explanations 
it provided, it appears that a lot of infringements to IP were observed and 
that WOTC had difficulties to control the behavior of other publishers, 
especially new ones.
5.3.2. Open business model and the burst  
of editors and products
The second problem faced by WOTC and other competitors which was pro-
bably less anticipated relates to the number of competitors in the sector 
and its consequences. Indeed, the entry inducement generated by the open 
BM produced an increasing competitive pressure for all the editors and 
publishers. If the bubble of inefficiencies described initially by Dancey 
were producing incompatibility costs between the different systems in the 
market, they had the merit of protecting each system from the competi-
tion of other incompatible products. Henceforth, all the d20 products were 
in direct competition with all the numerous other products and the mar-
ket became overcrowded (Table 4). Around 2003-2004, these deleterious 
effects were acknowledged by many actors as suggested by the following 
citations among many others:
“The number of companies that started doing d20 products has already been 
reduced. The good ones will stay around. D20 is a great idea and allows a little guy 
to have his chance in the sun. My only major concern is rising prices as a result of 
fewer sold books. It’s hard to stand out in the d20 field without some gimmick or 
license.” (D. Arneson (co-author of D&D in 1974); EN World, 06/28/2004).
The Rise and Fall oF an open Business Model
R E V U E D’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 14 6  ➻  2 E T R IME S T R E 2 014104
“The d20 license has taken the gaming world literally by storm. There are now 
tens of companies and hundreds of products and it seems that more are released 
every week […] WotC need not worry about support for the D&D Third Edition 
game system and the whole promotes not only that core work but spreads the sys-
tem’s rule and mechanics into many new areas. It has made D&D Third Edition the 
master of RPGs thus. The drawbacks I see are these: there is no product quality 
control. The D&D mark is not gaining recognition on support material produced 
under the OGL. WotC is not gaining any licensing income. Over-use of the d20 mark 
might hurt the base system, through application where it does not work well and 
by sheer over-exposure.” (Gary Gygax (co-author of D&D in 1974); EN World, 
06/28/2004)
“d20 has changed the marketplace in a lot of ways: because there were so many 
new products coming out, retails and distributors have stopped paying attention 
back-list product: all the emphasis is on new books. It used to be that a new source-
book would have decent sales figures for at least a year; now most of them are dead 
pulp after three or four months. And it’s not just us: I’ve spoken to many compa-
nies who are reporting really soft reorders, and sales way down.” (James Wallis, 
Hogshead Publishing, Ogrecave.com /2003)
“Try not to think that hitching your wagon to the d20 train means automatic suc-
cess. The market is flooded with d20products and there are books on just about 
every conceivable topic, race, class, monster or setting for it, especially if you take 
into account the smaller press. The market is very competitive, so you’ll need to 
have a truly outstanding product (preferably something nobody else has touched 
upon), and a touch of class to have a chance of doing really well in this area. The 
same follows, substantially, for OGL material. Don’t think that other licenses neces-
sarily offer a safe harbor from these problems as they have problems of their own, 
chiefly a lack of brand recognition.” (Minion Development Corp., 2004, p.7).
These citations indicate several negative effects that explain the decrease 
in the release of d20 products after 2005. First, it appears that the num-
ber of companies –both professional and amateur- in the sector increased 
so largely that it creates too many products in the market. In the mean-
time, the RPG sales continued to decline and the market was unable to 
absorb so many new products (McEd, 2010). Secondly, it became difficult to 
make choice for consumers among hundreds of products. It was especially 
problematic when products of highly varying quality – from crappy pro-
ducts to high-quality standard – were on the market and the institutions 
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built to counteract the quality uncertainty (such as logos and trademarks) 
were deficient (Akerlof, 1970). At least, the search costs for consumers were 
significantly increased to find products of quality. This quality issue was 
pointed out by the article 4 of the license: “Quality Standards. The nature of 
all material you use or distribute that incorporates the Licensed Articles must comply 
with all applicable laws and regulations, as well as community standards of decency, 
as further described in the d20 System Guide. You must use your best efforts to pre-
serve the high standard and goodwill of the Licensed Trademarks. In order to assure 
the foregoing standard and quality requirements, Wizards of the Coast shall have the 
right, upon notice to you, to review and inspect all material released by you that uses 
the Licensed Articles. You shall fully cooperate with Wizards of the Coast to facilitate 
such review and inspection, including timely provision of copies of all such materials 
to Wizards of the Coast. Wizards of the Coast may terminate this License immediately 
upon attempted notice to you if it deems, in its sole discretion, that your use of the 
Licensed Articles does not meet the above standards” (Article 4, The D20 System 
Trademark License version 6.0).
Finally, the overcrowding in the market created a supplementary incen-
tive for publishers to differentiate their products by acquiring expenses 
licenses of well-known trademarks such as Star Wars, comic book series or 
TV shows, inducing paradoxically rising prices for consumers.
5.4. The end of the open business model
Even from the point of view of the leader, the d20 system was probably 
not as successful as expected. We have no profit figures to provide on 
this point, but WOTC laid off its licensing director in 2008 and with the 
release of the 4th edition of D&D in 2008, the company revoked the ori-
ginal d20 license, replacing it with a new license specifically for D&D, 
known as the Game System License (GSL). The terms of this license are 
similar to the d20 license, but there is no more association with the 
OGL, and thus, no more content totally open. It is noticeable that the 
new GSL is incompatible with the previous OGL as many publishers sug-
gest this restriction represents a direct attack on the OGL which WOTC 
is legally unable to revoke. This restriction has fostered some negative 
feelings within the RPG communities against the leader and resulted in 
many publishers who previously supported the d20 system to reject the 
4th Edition of D&D entirely. As a consequence, a lot of publishers which 
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were previously adopters of the d20 system decided to develop their own 
set of rules based on elements of the OGL and publishing their own mate-
rial under the OGL.
Indeed, while the new GSL license can be interpreted partially as a return 
to the original proprietary BM of the leader and at least a will to end the 
open license policy, it appears that numerous publishers turn towards the 
OGL more than in the d20 area.
6. DISCUSSION
In this study, we trace back the evolution of a sector where the leader 
moved from a proprietary BM to an open BM, more specifically a two-
sided platform BM (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009). The main interest of 
the article is especially to connect the strategic motives to transform a 
proprietary BM and the impacts of a BM with a high level of openness 
on the overall sector. At least, our research shows that open BM (and its 
antecedent open innovation) encompasses various kinds of approach (from 
simple R&D partnership to open source) and that the consequences of the 
adoption of such BM may vary greatly. Of course, this analysis concerns 
only a micro market which has little economic weight by itself, probably 
less than US $10 million today. Moreover, three potential limitations of 
this research may be noted. First, studying RPG industry, we have obser-
ved a specific open BM. Indeed, the d20 system appears as a highly open 
BM as it is based on the partial abandonment of IP rights by WOTC. Most 
of times, open BM encompasses forms of partnerships which do not neces-
sary lead to complete IP openness (Henkel, 2006). The entry inducement 
and the large adoption of the d20 system that we have observed in the 
RPG industry have been probably reinforced by this high level of open-
ness of the BM. Second, WOTC, the company that has introduced the open 
BM, was the leader on the RPG market. We may wonder if the same rise 
and fall of this BM would have been observed with the case of a less pro-
minent company. For instance, some reactions of rejection were observed 
due to the fear of a complete dominance of the leader over the market. 
Third, an alternative explanation for the failure of the open BM consists 
in considering that the RPG market was declining since the 90’s and that 
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this decline continued despite the d20 system, inciting the leader to aban-
don his initiative. 
Despite these limitations, some interesting lessons can be drawn from the 
case exactly because of its modest size and the easiness to detect the moves 
and reactions of the firms. Moreover, the open BM under study was also 
adopted by major firms in other important sectors (Chesbrough, 2006) and 
the RPG is finally a sector where products embedded intensive knowledge, 
even if it appears as a low-tech sector (Lecocq and Demil, 2006). Thus, the 
case allows a theoretical generalization (Yin, 2005). Given the results and 
limitations, several contributions of the paper may be highlighted. 
First, industry structure is traditionally and theoretically apprehended 
in economics as related to the number of firms, the entry barriers and 
the average size of companies on the market. In the RPG industry, the 
new open BM modified largely each of these characteristics: the number 
of companies increased due to a decrease of the entry barriers, and the 
average size decreased after numerous new entrants appeared. Thus, an 
open BM has the power to modify profoundly the structure of a sector. 
In a more sociological view of markets, these modifications of the mar-
ket structure follow the modifications of relationships between the actors 
of the market and favor the emergence of co-evolution instead of autono-
mous evolution (see Table 1). Indeed, the intended result of the open BM 
was exactly to reshuffle the relationships between actors and especially 
to connect all the actors whereas the market was previously highly frag-
mented in multiple micro-communities. An open BM unified potentially 
most of the communities in a market by allowing the sharing of a common 
platform that incorporated a common knowledge, as it has been observed 
in OSS (West, 2003). These new relationships can be considered as creating 
value for consumers by decreasing the “knowledge tax”6 on the market, 
the interoperability costs between products and by increasing the choice 
within the same system. For companies, the open BM creates also value by 
increasing the global potential of the market and by benefiting from the 
possibility to create new products as patches of a global system and not 
to start from scratch. These modifications in the relationships between 
6 “Because those rules are not interoperable, you have to pay a “knowledge tax” every time you 
want to use a product from a different publisher. […] The real effect of that diversity is to reduce 
the value of the products you own!” (R. Dancey, 2002).
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actors concern also entrepreneurs who are not initially in the market. 
Indeed, the success in the diffusion of the d20 lies partly in its capacity 
to attract new entrants (Kogut et al., 1995), indicating that the sponsor of 
an open BM should always envisage the arrival of new actors and not only 
concentrates on the current actors of its market. 
Second, the case indicates also the pitfalls of an open BM. Indeed, the end 
of the open BM in 2008 underlines the difficulties for a sponsor to cap-
ture a share of the potential value created for consumers. This decision 
indicates that a sponsor may encounter several difficulties after intro-
ducing an open BM. A company adopting an open BM may have difficul-
ties to impose IP rights, especially in a sector where amateurism prevails, 
and subsequently to capture value. But beyond value capture, the case of 
the RPG industry also demonstrates that the success of an open BM in 
the short term in terms of value creation may lead to a drastic change in 
the value creation in the mid or long term. We have observed especially 
an overcrowding of the market with an intensification of the competi-
tion and a subsequent increase in the search costs for consumers to iden-
tify products, a higher variability in product quality, and difficulties for 
consumers to sort the wheat from the chaff. This observation suggests that 
the value creation and value capture mechanisms have to be grasped dyna-
mically as they evolve themselves with the structure of the sector. Having 
adopted a longitudinal view of the sector, we are able to distinguish a 
first period of success when the open license was heavily supported by 
coopetitors and the discourses were enthusiastic. But over time, openness 
allows the emergence of numerous publishers and products with heteroge-
neous quality overcrowded the market. Whereas we recorded around 6200 
different products from 1974 to 1999, the number of d20 products alone 
accounts for more than 3800 from 2000 to 20097. Thus, if learning costs 
decreased for customers by unifying different systems, the search costs 
for products of quality increased importantly with the number of pro-
ducts based on d20 system. As a consequence, it was not only the value 
capture process that suffers from the openness but also the value crea-
tion process. Thus, what we observe here is that open BM may also in the 
mid-term lead to reduce value creation for customers. Another problem 
for the leader was the difficulty to anticipate the number of adopters of 
7 RPG Index encyclopaedia.
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its d20 license. When a company decides to grant restrictively licenses to 
few licensees, it may select them drastically on the basis of their comple-
mentary assets. However, with an open BM diffusing knowledge and IP 
without strong selection mechanisms of partners, the risk is to diffuse 
too largely these elements and to see the burst of coordination and control 
costs. That’s why -in our view- in RPG industry the leader terminates its 
open BM in 2008. From a general point of view, we may wonder if the 
open BM constitutes a sustainable strategy or if it has to be considered as 
a temporary movement to reach some goals before coming back to a closer 
approach (Garud et al., 2002). Indeed, an open BM promotes co-evolution 
between firms within an industry instead of autonomous and competitive 
trajectories of systems. Thus a sponsor promoting an open BM may gain 
control over its sectors in the short-term but may lose, at least partially, 
control over future evolutions in the sector. 
In the same line, our case points to the difficulties of succeeding finan-
cially with an open BM. Indeed, the case describes a semi-failure for the 
leader implementing the open BM. This contrasts with the relatively opti-
mistic tone of the open innovation literature, presenting the open pro-
cesses as a new ‘one best way’ to innovate and to succeed. In the RPG case 
study, the openness enables to attract numerous coopetitors and to inno-
vate in terms of product at the level sector. It enables also to establish a 
standard shared by the competitors and to avoid the bubble of market inef-
ficiencies denounced by the sponsor of the initiative. This standardized 
platform can be viewed as a way of reducing transaction costs for consu-
mers because traditionally, learning costs occurred each time a con sumer 
has to learn how to use each product. Thus, in terms of value generation, 
the open BM enables at short term to offer more diversity and reduce tran-
saction costs for consumers. The problems arise when value capture is 
considered. Indeed, the abandonment of the open BM in 2008 tends to 
demonstrate the inefficiency of the partial openness of knowledge and IP 
for the leader. Different mechanisms sap potentially the value capture of 
WOTC. This result echoes the observation of Dahlander and Magnusson 
(2005) in the open software communities. Profit-driven companies adop-
ting openness may be confronted with communities driven eventually by 
social values and the cohabitation of different rationales may render diffi-
cult the cooperation and the acceptance of the dominance of an actor over 
a community.
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Third, the case study illustrates how a leader may impact its overall sec-
tor by changing its BM. In the RPG sector, the open BM created clearly 
an entry induction by offering opportunities for new entrants and trans-
formed subsequently the structure of the sector at least in terms of new 
entrants and barriers to entry. Thus, an open BM supported by a leader 
may incite others to establish more cooperative relationships between the 
firms of a sector, generating potentially more value for consumers. Indeed, 
with this open BM, new products proliferate on the market and diversity 
increased at the product-level for any consumers, making compatible what 
was previously incompatible. Consequently, the BM innovation should be 
envisaged as a potential way to restructure the relationships between cus-
tomers but also complementors and not only as a way to differentiate from 
competitors. Indeed, traditionally the literature recognizes the role of BM 
innovation to reshape entire industries, but generally this shake out is 
related to an exceptional success of a company which is imitated or not. 
Successes such as Amazon, Apple or Southwest Airlines have been reco-
gnized for a long time as major BM innovators because they change radi-
cally the competitive landscape in their respective sectors. But thanks to 
a global view on an entire population, we can observe that there is other 
ways to reshape a sector if a company has a prominent position in a sector. 
Thus, this conclusion holds potentially only for leaders or co-leaders or, at 
least, for companies having assets of great value for other coopetitors.
Finally, some recommendations can be drawn at the end of our study relati-
vely to the open BM. In terms of methodology, the performance of an open 
BM can be apprehended very differently according the period of observa-
tion. Over time, performance of such initiative may evolve drastically and 
researchers should pay attention to avoid focusing only on short period 
of observation. In our view, what explain or not the success of such a BM 
is a cumulated set of transactions, not isolated one (Demil and Lecocq, 
2006). For instance, need for coordination or control may evolve exponen-
tially over time and generate rapidly huge costs. Another methodological 
point relates to the performance targeted by the sponsor of an open BM. 
The success of this strategic choice depends heavily on the objectives pur-
sued. They can be to reduce R&D costs, to face shorter product life-cycle, 
impose a standard, or increase revenues (Chesbrough, 2006; Garud and 
Kumaraswany, 1993; Garud et al., 2002). In the RPG case, financial inte-
rest was at the heart of the implementation of an open BM. Thus, despite 
its success in terms of adoption and diffusion, the open BM did not allow 
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WOTC to make a lot of money after a few years. This point recalls that any 
open BM should be evaluated according to its initial objectives. But, as the 
success of an open BM depends on cooperation or co-evolution – and thus, 
is partially out of the control of the firm-, there are risks that unanticipa-
ted elements affecting performance arise. In terms of managerial recom-
mendations, a company should pay attention to strategic flexibility when 
adopting an open BM, i.e. the capacity to avoid irreversible choices. In our 
case, the leader’s BM evolves from a proprietary to an open then, finally, 
to a less open BM. This sequence illustrates the fact that a company may 
need to come back in the openness of its BM. Thus, diffusing cautiously 
IP and knowledge and keeping an eye on the aggregate consequences of 
open innovation should be a golden rule for any company moving into 
this path.
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